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"drainage, drainage, DRAINAGE"
CREATING NATURAL DISASTERS
IN SOUTHEASTERN NEBRASKA

WILLIAM KEITH GUTHRIE

off a highway northwest of Syracuse; only three
of nine in the bus would survive. A young
mother and father had their two infant sons
torn from their arms as they abandoned their
automobile on a nearby minor tributary. At
daybreak, sixty miles downriver at Auburn, a
family of four on their way to a funeral in
Kansas had their car stall out on an approach
to a bridge over the Little Nemaha. Witnesses
saw the waters take them one by one. These
deaths were only the most visible manifestations of the disaster. Homes, businesses, vehicles, and domestic livestock were lost.
Sloping fields on uplands lost topsoil in depths
"up to the plow sole"; fields down on the flood
plain would be covered at places by five feet of
thi~ topsoil. Railroads, bridges, and roads suffered severe damage. People were stranded in
attics as their houses floated downstream; some
spent horrifying hours lodged high up in trees,
hoping floating debris would miss them. One
family between Syracuse and Auburn was
barely able to remain safe for seven hours on
the tiny island that was the roof of their pickup
truck. 2 It was a situation way beyond human
control. Most people would consider it a clear
example of natural disaster.

In May 1950 the Little Nemaha River valley
in the southeastern quadrant of Nebraska suffered a record-breaking flood. For a short time
at the town of Syracuse, the Little Nemaha
River, which drained a watershed of 218 square
miles, had an estimated discharge of 225,000
cubic feet per second. This was larger than
any flood recorded since 1928 on the Missouri
River at Omaha, which drained a watershed of
322,000 square miles.! During this storm and
flood twenty-three people lost their lives, fourteen in the Little Nemaha Valley. As night
came on, floodwaters swept a commercial bus
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Here I examine the history of flooding on
the Little Nemaha as a case study of human
relationships to a common form of natural
hazard. Through the history of human responses to a particular river in flood, I also
seek understanding of the variety of human
roles in creating natural disaster out of this
common hazard of flooding. Natural hazards
exist when humans have made themselves
vulnerable to nature's forces. As I am using
the term, "natural disaster" refers to the situation after the hazard has fulfilled its potentiality, that is, after natural forces have negatively
impacted humans. The Little Nemaha affords
a useful vehicle for studying these relationships because of its history of repeated flooding. The record-breaking 1950 flood is not
important simply as a case of an extreme natural event. It derives part of its instructive power
for us (and for Syracuse residents) because
people expended such effort protecting themselves from flooding. The lesson residents
might have taken from the event was that they
could ill afford to ignore a river's natural propensity to flood. Had they considered this carefully, it might have challenged their confidence
in the adequacy of using technology to reengineer natural processes.
NATURAL DISASTERS

Human complicity in a natural hazard, while
being a cause, is also a result; it arises from
something else. I argue that one type of natural disaster followed from basic human perceptions toward, and use of, nature. Floods do
not start without unusually intense or prolonged precipitation (discounting dam breaks).
The record-breaking 1950 Syracuse flood followed from extraordinary (though not record)
rainfall amounts on two watersheds that converged on Syracuse at the same time. Other
floods on this river also began with good rains,
and, in fact, some storms on the river have
had greater total amounts, and higher rates of
precipitation, than during this flood. While
southeast Nebraska is primarily rural without
large centers of population, the people who do

live in the Little Nemaha Valley have made
themselves particularly vulnerable. They have
done so through both their settlement patterns (living in a flood plain) and land usage
(farming row crops on marginal prairie land).
Unfortunately, in arriving at causation for
natural disaster, a model of natural disaster as
an extreme environmental event meeting a
vulnerable human population (as a function
of size or usage) is not quite complete. An
entry here may be through the phrase "nature
is neutral." Is it not the point that for humans
nature is not neutral? It is not neutral on two
sides of our event. Nature created conditions
which humans found attractive: rich farmland
on flood plains and amenable transportation
route possibilities. This is not a perceived neutral nature, it is a beneficent nature. And what
of the event itself? During or after a flood,
nature is anything but neutral. Humans often
perceive it as a malevolent force. Nature is an
entity divorced from its beneficent aspect in
human perception. It calls for responses both
immediate and long term. And the repeated
experience of flooding in Southeastern Nebraska brought changes in human responses.
But the responses also fell within carefully circumscribed limits. I would contend that the
inhabitants' responses flowed from their basic
perceptions toward, and use of, nature.
Simply put, nature was a commodity to be
used for human purposes. Euro-American settlers' use of the land for commercial agriculture led to worse flooding. This view is in stark
contrast to eastern Nebraska's Native American land usage patterns. Euro-Americans built
their towns along the river's edge to service
the railroad (as entrepots for farm produce).
They made roads and bridges that linked farms,
towns, railroads, and eventually world markets. It was a system designed for efficiency.
The locations chosen discounted nature in two
aspects: the nature of the land and the nature
of the river. The land-use practices of the settlers all too often were nonsustainable, creating conditions which led to soil loss through
sheet erosion, and incidentally, increased severity of flooding. Their actions on the land
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thus changed the river. The river was not a
static entity; it did not always stay in its channel-it never had. But the roads, railroads,
and towns were built as though it did. And
when it came up, and came up faster and higher
due to human land-use practices, the valley's
residents were swimming in consequences.
The first solution was to make a "better"
river, a more efficient river. If valley residents
had too much water in their towns, the solution was to get rid of it faster than it came in.
They straightened and shortened the river
through channelization. This worked, after a
fashion, but led to its own consequences.
Channelization provided a measure of false
security, encouraging further development
subject to flooding; it also led to unintended
channel dynamics. Eventually channelization
created increased damage downstream. But the
commercial agricultural system was so profitable they would not seriously consider removing themselves from danger; people kept trying
to engineer safety.
Cultural perceptions of nature guided human choices on both sides of the disaster: first,
by perceiving that nature was amenable to
human exploitation, with little regard for the
consequences, then attempting solutions divorced from what had created the disaster in
the first place. Valley residents unwittingly
designed a relationship to nature that made
themselves particularly vulnerable to natural
hazard.
STRUCTURE AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LITTLE NEMAHA VALLEY

By the twentieth century, Euro-American
settlers had formed the essential structure of
their built environment in relationship to the
river that still exists today. The major road
systems formed a "T," with Syracuse lying at
the juncture. Turning right on State Highway
2 (the top of the T) took residents to the grain
elevators in Nebraska City, twenty miles to
the east. There prodigious quantities of agricultural produce could be moved efficiently
down the Missouri. Turning left, State High-
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way 2 took them the thirty-three miles to Lincoln, the state capital. On the way they passed
through other towns carrying names some of
their forebears brought with them from New
York: Unadilla, then Palmyra. The railroad,
which had preceded the state highway and
was so important to the development of the
upper Little Nemaha Valley, also followed the
top of the T.
But before there was a T there was the river
itself. From its headwaters near Bennett in
this approximately sixty-mile-long valley, the
river meandered along eastward, nearing the
railroad and highway at Palmyra, and again at
Unadilla, there turning southeastward on its
way to Syracuse. Below Syracuse it flowed fourteen miles to the town of Talmage, then Brock,
and Auburn (Nemaha County seat), where it
usually flowed underneath another railroad,
the Missouri-Pacific, down an ever-widening
floodplain turned to fields, finally entering the
Missouri River near Nemaha.
The Otoe-Missourian peoples who resided
in southeastern Nebraska before the arrival of
the Euro-Americans did not leave us with a
clear picture of their relationship to rivers in
flood. Like the Euro-Americans who would
replace them on the land, the Otoe-Missourias
were presumably drawn to the enriched spoils
and moisture afforded by seasonal flooding of
rivers and creeks. Their subsistence base, unlike that of the Euro-American farmer's, was
not tied to a specific plot of land; it spread
over space. During the late spring three or
four women would go down to the creek bottoms and plant their corn, pumpkins, squash,
beans, and melons. The word "Nemaha," in
f~ct, comes from Otoe words "ne," water, and
"maha," planting or cultivating. 3 In June, when
corn reached chest height, the entire village
might be abandoned as the tribe went on an
extended summer bison hunt in central Kansas. The tribe would return to the village in
time to harvest the corn. By 1800 a majority
of their diet came from the spring and fallwinter bison hunts. 4 In addition to horticulture and twice-yearly bison hunts, they also
gathered roots and hunted for small game and
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deer nearer home. As David J. Wishart notes,
"the combined hunting, farming and gathering cycle spread their subsistence base over a
wide area and was a successful ecological adaptation to the transitional tall-grass and
mixed-grass environments of the Great
Plains."5
Adaptation is the key here, made necessary
because the Otoe-Missourias had come to
southeastern Nebraska in relatively recent
times. During the seventeenth century the
Dakota had pushed the Otoes (a Siouian
people) from their original homeland near the
Great Lakes. They generally migrated southwest under the pressure of stronger tribes, until by 1714 they had lodged against the Salt
Creek tributary of the Platte near its juncture
with the Missouri River. Here they would control a part of southeastern Nebraska that contained the Little Nemaha, but they were
prevented from further expansion by the
Omaha to the north, the Pawnee to the west,
and the Kansa to the south. At the turn of the
century, the Otoe were joined by their relatives, the Missouria, in a somewhat uncomfortable union. After being weakened by
smallpox and under the onslaught of the Sauk
and Fox, the Missouria had fled from their
homeland in Missouri. 6
Wishart notes how quickly the OtoeMissouria (and other Indian peoples) adapted
to their new home. What is important for us is
that they practiced subsistence patterns that
did not perforce set them at odds with a river's
natural propensity to flood. They built their
villages conservatively on secondary terracesexpressly to remain above floodstage, locating
them close to timber and water. 7 If their patterns of movement about the landscape were
inconvenienced at times by the river's rise (as
during the spring runoff), they would have
found this a natural, regular occurrence and a
part of their pattern of living. Flooding was a
benefit to the Otoe-Missouria-it provided
moisture and enrichment for the soils they
farmed on the living floodplain. This is not to
say that the Otoe-Missouria never experienced
the negative effects of flooding. For example,

widespread flooding in the summer of 1844,
which took streams from Colorado's foothills
to the Mississippi River to record heights, destroyed Otoe corn crops along the Platte. The
point is that their subsistence base was broader
than relying on their horticultural economy.s
By the time the Kansas-Nebraska Act
opened southeastern Nebraska to Euro-American settlement in 1854, the Otoe-Missouria
had been forced to cede their lands in southeastern Nebraska through a series of treaties
and incremental land cessations. In the treaty
of March 1854 they agreed to move southwest
to a rectangular parcel of land in the Blue
River Valley.9
By this time what would become Otoe
County was a corridor well-traveled by settlers headed west (roughly following the top
of our T). Euro-American settlers came to the
rolling, hilly country of southeastern Nebraska
under two impulses: first, to exploit the rich
agricultural potential, of the prairie, and second, to exploit the settlers heading west-to
service a human traffic pattern. The sloping,
loess-covered hills, once the thick prairie sod
was removed, had rich agricultural potential,
and this quadrant of Nebraska did not require
irrigation, as it received an average of over
thirty inches of rain per year (70 percent of
which fell in the growing season April through
September) .10 Yet some of the earliest EuroAmericans hoped the land might yield profits
without going through the enormous work it
took to make a farm. The territorial legislature allowed speculators and squatters to form
"claim clubs," and by 1856 settlers (many of
whom would pay for land using their warrants
from the Mexican War) were having to move
into central and western Otoe County to find
unclaimed land not held by speculators. Syracuse, in fact, originated-at least as a namedue to one group of speculators. After finding
salt marshes in the area (six miles west of
present-day Syracuse), these speculators hoped
to cash in on the connection of the name with
Syracuse, New York, which was known as a
salt center. As Nebraska was laid out on the
township grid system, these speculators filed
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in 1856 as the "Syracuse Town Company."
Although they advertised their lands back East,
the effort proved unsuccessful. 11 The real town
of Syracuse would follow from another impulse, as a transportation-route service point.
Nebraska City was incorporated in 1855 at
a ferry point that had been established the
year before on the Missouri. It was near the
site of the old Fort Kearny, which had been
abandoned in 1848. New Fort Kearny was now
situated at the southernmost bend of the Platte,
250 miles away; and the route between the
two was called the Overland Trail. Within
twenty years the railroad would follow a nearly
identical route between Nebraska City and
Lincoln. The route would be shortened in
1860, saving seventy-five miles and becoming
known as the Nebraska City-Fort Kearny Cutoff. The first town west of Nebraska City on
this route was Nursery Hill; it lay on the Little
Nemaha two miles west of what would become Syracuse. It was the location of a floral
nursery (serving a New York company), several stores, and the area's first grist mill (1868).
This was a heavily traveled route-one settler
claimed he had seen a hundred wagons pass
before eight o'clock one morning.
The new settlers of the Little Nemaha Valley showed clear patterns of both cluster and
chain migration. Many came from the Midwest: first Ohio, later Wisconsin and Illinois.
There was an early and continuing pattern of
migration from New York State, reflected in
town names across Otoe County, not just in
the Little Nemaha Valley, e.g., Syracuse,
Unadilla, Palymra. There was a strong presence of German immigrants spread out across
Otoe County; the 1870 census would show
1,173 German-born residents out of the
county's 12,345. By 1900 this had grown to
2,250 out of 15, 7. More than half of the
German immigrants would arrive by steamer
up the Missouri, disembarking at Nebraska
City. Palmyra Township had a very strong
British presence, with over a third of its population in 1870 born in England and 10 percent
born in Ireland. It would take time for these
new immigrants, with cultural preferences for
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growing particular crops, and from climates
having different patterns of precipitation, to
adjust to a new environmental context.
Whether they actually adjusted to the physical constraints of the prairie environment is
a deeper question. I argue that the valley's
natural disasters were ultimately a factor of
its inhabitants' nonadjustment to natural limitS. 12

Both Syracuse and Unadilla were creations
of settlers who saw the railroad coming and
took active measures to be sure it came their
way. A group of five settlers residing in the
Syracuse Township saw the possibility of making a town via the development of the railroad
that was to be built between Nebraska City
and Lincoln. In 1870 they donated 240 acres
to the Midland Pacific Railroad to bring it
through section sixteen of the township.13
Syracuse prospered and Nursery Hill slowly
withered. A land agent originally from
Unadilla, New York, having relatives who
worked for the Midland Pacific and had "inside information" about the future railroad
route, platted Unadilla, Nebraska, in May
1871. Presumably his efforts paid off. Main
Street soon followed the curved line of the
railroad tracks. 14 The railroad was drawn both
by the subsidy of humans (free land) and, perhaps of equal importance, by nature's provision. Gilbert White described this latter factor
in 1945. In rough terrain railroads followed
"the easiest possible grades for the longest
possible distances."15 Not only were grades of
import for the railroad engineers but wide
floodplains allowed the possibility of low curvature. D. W. Washburn, a locating engineer
for the Jay Gould lines in the southwest instr~cted, "drainage, drainage, DRAINAGE.
The drainage and location of the drainage is
the framework on which you must hang your
location. "16 Dry and gentle floodplains do
not stay that way, of course; it is not in the
nature of a river to do so.
The Midland Pacific followed the earlier
traffic patterns through the area, ones that
humans used for the same physical reasons.
White described a typical result of railroad
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presence: "Highways and urban occupance
have developed flood-plain locations in many
instances in order to be near some railway
rather than because of any other advantages
of the flood plain."17 And this describes succinctly the development of Syracuse, Unadilla,
and Auburn-these towns grew up around the
depot. The railroads (certainly prior to hardsurfaced highways) were their outlets to the
world. The towns suffered from the same problem that beset the railroad from time to timethe river acted in its nature, but not for a
while, and not until humans had made real
efforts to aid it on its way.
The river appears somewhat abstract in the
early accounts, possibly because it had a restricted value as commodity. As it was not
used for irrigation or as a source of drinking
water, perhaps it lay outside of the purview of
farmers who were settling the area. Its utility
as power for grist and flour mills was restricted
to a few proprietors (although the larger community certainly benefited, and some had grandiose plans for water-generated power). But
most of the farm produce was soon heading
out of the valley into a world market. The
river as hindrance steadily diminished as the
railroad became important for transportation
and as bridges replaced fords (the big iron
bridge right below Unadilla dated from 1874;
it remained until the Big Flood took it in
1950).18 Residents appreciated the river as a
place to swim, particularly in the pools created behind the mill dams. This river was fun
and useful, but it was not so much fun or so
useful as to loom large in the new natives'
field of view.
Oldtimers remembered prairie grasses as
high as six to eight feet in the Nemaha Valley.
Probably apocryphal were the stories of chasing deer into the thick grass and catching them
when they became tangled. 19 The land, once
plowed, made good farms. The history here, as
in so many places on the Great Plains, may be
telescoped into the telling phrase provided by
Donald Worster: "The sod had been destroyed
to make farms to grow wheat to get cash."20 It

was an effective transformation, as the land
produced vast quantities of corn and wheat.
Census records depict both the population
growth and the expansion of agricultural production in southeast Nebraska between 1860
and 1890 (Table 1). The rapid expansion of
corn production in Otoe County between 1870
and 1880, from roughly 600,000 to 3.5 million
bushels, illustrates the rapidity with which the
prairie was being turned to make cropland. It
also shows why the floodplain dwellers (such
as those in Syracuse) suffered from increased
severity of flooding. The decline in wheat production between 1880 and 1890 was a factor
not only of higher profitability for corn per
acre but an attenuation of cultural preferences
for growing wheat rather than corn (which
some immigrants, such as British and Germans,
brought with them from the Old Country).21
The existence of the mill at Nursery Hill by
1868 and one soon established upriver at
Unadilla in 1875 give additional evidence that
the land was being settled thickly enough that
there was need for them. The Syracuse Milling Company would arrive in the late 1890s,
replacing the Unadilla mill. 22
In 1878,350 carloads of grain and 100 carloads of stock left Syracuse. Three years later,
in a relatively poor year for farming, the total
had increased to 641 carloads: corn, 323; swine,
130; cattle, 94; wheat, 54; barley, 34; and rye,
11.24 The tendency was to expand production
with little regard for the long-term consequences. This would come back to haunt them,
as it did so graphically in the 1950 flood, when
freshly tilled soil on unterraced, sloping land
in the very beginning of the growing season
ended up deposited thickly on floodplains. But
as we have seen, the removal of the thick
thatch of sod altered hydrologic characteristics of the land. 25
FLOODS AND RESPONSES, 1883-1950
As farmers in Little Nemaha Valley put
more and more land to crops in the 1870s and
1880s, the people of the valley started having
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increasingly severe problems with flooding.
When general rains struck southeast Nebraska
in June 1883, which the Syracuse Journal headlined as "The Heaviest Rain Ever Known in
this Section," the Little Nemaha near Syracuse "overflowed and spread about a mile over
the valley." Families had to evacuate homes;
the floodwaters on the south of Syracuse came
up to Third Street. Several people nearly
drowned riding horses across water, and a team
of horses mired, proving ineffective in one
rescue. Five townsmen had apparently just
built a boat, christened the Billy Powell. It was
used to good effect in rescuing a number of
people. One of the men, a Mr. Beesley, found
it so handy, in fact, he bought it the next week
"so as to be prepared for floods in the future."
The Burlington and Missouri Railroad (which
had purchased the Midland Pacific in 1877)
lost bridges, had whole sections wrecked, and
lost ten thousand feet of track at Syracuse.
Towns downriver such as Brock, Talmage, and
Nemaha City suffered flood damage. The local news column in the Syracuse paper, always
hoping to strike a lighter note, reported, "On
account of the almost incessant rains of late,
the beautiful (?) weeds are flourishing."26
During the next week railroad crews began
patching up the line. Then, a storm of even
greater intensity hit Syracuse and vicinity. The
Syracuse Journal reported the result of one
night's six and a half inches of rain: "When
morning came the streams and valleys were
one wide seething sea, bridges were swept away
in all directions, and communications and
travel both by horse and rail rendered nearly
impossible." Railroad track that had just been
"patched up" washed away, the train could
not get past Unadilla, and the area lost more
bridges: "The wooden bridge on the road to
Nursery Hill, broke in the middle and dropped
into the creek a sorry wreck."27 There was no
report if Mr. Beesley used his new Billy Powell.
Damage was not confined to the built environment; it hit farmland as well. But, again,
the local paper chose to give the story a positive spin:
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In many places in the valley the damage to
crops was great, but strange to say in some
instances the gain exceeded the loss. On
the Van Riper farm, though 100 acres of
grain was more or less damaged, yet the
sediment that settled in the low places did
his farm more good than the loss to his
crops, so that on the whole he is better off
than before the floods. 28
This passage indicates two things: obviously,
some recognized that a normally functioning
nature did produce benefits for humans, but in
comparison with later flood sediment damage, it indicates that a good bit of the prairie
had not yet been turned to cropland (else Mr.
Van Riper probably would have gained too
much for his own good). This is also in line
with the census data, showing a rise in Otoe
County's corn production between 1880 and
1890 from 3.5 million to 5.3 million bushels
(Table 1). The second point of interest is that
the writer apparently gave little thought to
where that rich sediment might be coming
from-his focus was on crop loss, not topsoil
loss. Two Nebraska scientists may have recently given us an indication as to why: "Soil
loss is especially tragic because, at least in
Nebraska, it is very nearly invisible. In general, erosion in our state does not take the
form of gullies, as it does, for example, in the
South. Much of it is result of sheet or ephemeral erosion where one pass with a field cultivator can completely mask it."29
By 1906 the residents along the upper river
had enough experience with a series of minor
floods that they convinced the owner of
Unadilla Roller Mills that his dam was to
bl~me. As he had stopped using water power
to run his mill in 1897 when he purchased a
gasoline engine, he acceded to their demands
and blew up the dam. 30 It did not stop the
floods.
Two years after the dam's destruction another big flood hi t Unadilla; this time the damage was more serious than ever. It had started
raining heavily Sunday night, 5 July 1908, hard
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TABLE 1
GROWTH OF THE LITTLE NEMAHA VALLEY 1860-1890 23
1880

1890

1860

1870

Otoe County population
Syracuse [Township] population
Corn (in bushels)
Wheat (in bushels)

4,211

12,345
[640]
632,160
175,058

15,727
510 [1,138]
3,591,019
248,364

25,403
728 [1,495]
5,315,708
178,625

Nemaha County Population
Corn (in bushels)
Wheat (in bushels)

3,139

7,593
224,659
33,790

10,451
2,942,770
273,708

12,930
4,084,020
161,528

Note: In 1860, only township population was recorded. By 1870, both town and the larger
township was recorded in the census.

enough, in fact, that members of the Christian Church canceled services and headed
home or stayed with friends in town. It rained
heavily all night long. The next morning, John
Doyle was with a group of people at the lumberyard when he received a telephone call at
about six o'clock. Someone warned him that
he had better get his family out of his house,
which was between the railroad tracks and the
river (as were six or seven other homes). He
was apparently still arguing over the relative
danger of the situation (maintaining that his
house had survived several floods), when someone arrived at the yard with the news that
Doyle's house was floating down the river. Mr.
Doyle ran down the railroad tracks, chasing
his home, "trying to shout instructions and
encouragement to his family." This lasted
about three-quarters of a mile. Then his house
came apart, and he dove in to save them. All
six in the house died. A number of other homes
situated too near the river were also destroyed. 3 ! This time water rose as far as Main
Street in SyracuseY The learning curve on
the nature of this river was proving very steep.

By the mid-teens, some of the valley's residents judged they had suffered enough from
the river and it was time for more direct action. They formed drainage districts with the
purview of reducing floods. For several years
these districts worked on ambitious channelization projects on two sections of the Little
Nemaha, a fourteen-mile stretch between Syracuse and Talmage, and a forty-mile stretch
from the Nemaha County line to the Missouri
River at Nemaha. Neither project was met
with enthusiasm from those whose property
the ditches traversed. Some landowners sold
out when they found the ditch might come
their way and others refused to let the ditch
cross their property. Huge land- and boat-based
dredges were used to create these nearly
straight channels. 33 Syracusans hoped that this
would improve the river's dilatory behavior
in draining the upper river. The problem as
they saw it was in all that senseless weaving,
meandering time the river took in getting rid
of excess water. If this solution seems
Herculean for such a small neck of the river,
presumably it was a natural bit of reverse engi-
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neering from their broader water experience.
Nebraskans had been constructing ambitious
ditches farther northwest for several decades
to bring irrigation water to fields that had
none. 14 Why not make a ditch to take water
away from where they had too much? Of course,
in doing so, as we have seen, the valley's residents were opening themselves to increased
danger in the future.
This began a new phase in the valley residents' relationship to their river in flood: from
now on most of their efforts would be directed
toward engineering a safe river. After a storm
in the summer of 1917 , shortly after the Syracuse "Ditch" was completed, the paper congratulated the community on the wisdom of
its efforts, headlined as "Efficiency of Ditch
Pronounced Perfect." The story read as follows: "The efficiency of the drainage ditch
was again demonstrated last week. The mouth
of the ditch where it joins the Nemaha became clogged, and but for the prompt action
of Mr. Meeker and others who dislodged the
debris with dynamite, the bottoms would have
been flooded, but for the ditch."35 The author
missed the point of the story. The efficiency of
the ditch was not perfect. His assessment displays a characteristically over-optimistic assessment of using technology to solve nature's
"imperfections." It also demonstrates an inability, or an unwillingness, to recognize the
limitations of their technology, even at a most
basic level.
While the Little Nemaha flooded periodically between 1917 and mid-century, the flood
of 1950 dramatically revealed the harmful effects of the inhabitants' land-use practices and
the limitations of their engineering efforts. The
Soil Conservation Service's postflood survey
(which was limited to agriculture and county
roads, as the Corps of Engineers was responsible for assessing municipal, industrial, and
state and federal highway damage) determined
the 8-9 May 1950 storm and flood caused $53
million in damages. Of this they judged fully
88 percent resulted from "sheet erosion in the
uplands in the flood area." Bare, freshly tilled
fields awaiting corn suffered severe erosion,
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particularly on sloping land. Wheat fields did
much better but still lost as much as an inch of
soil. Oat fields, with plants "barely past the
emergence stage," eroded heavily, sometimes
losing more than two inches. The damage on
the lowlands was the reverse: "Ironically, much
of this soil, which constitutes such a vital resource in its position on the uplands, formed a
suffocating blanket over thousands of acres of
growing crops along bottomlands on the lower
reaches of streams where it was deposited in
some instances up to depths of five feet."36
Farmers on the floodplain probably would not
have characterized the siruation as "ironic";
their expressions would have more likely
tended toward "tragic."
The Soil Conservation Service based its
assessment of damage on an amortization of
reduced crop yields at $5,183,537 per crop
year. This would occur yearly "until such time
as steps are taken to restore it to its former
level of productivity .... When considered in
terms of the present or capitalized value of
the loss in production to the landowner, the
total loss due to sheet erosion adds up to
$46,661,775. "37 Restoration, here, is in terms
of crop production. The topsoil, the windblown loess from the Rocky Mountains that
had taken tens of millions of years to form,
was gone for good. The Soil Conservation
Service noted that while the monetary figure
was "startling," the accumulation of damages
from past storms (before their efforts in implementing soil conservation techniques) would
have been an even "more staggering figure."
That was true, but a more interesting and
thought-provoking comparison would have
been with the land prior to the removal of
sod.
A comprehensive Congressional report
published nearly a decade and a half later, in
1965, revealed inadequacies in the valley
residents' grand technological solution to
flooding; the channelization had done both
more and less than it was originally intended
to do. Channelization created its own hydraulic characteristics. As intended, it allowed
greater water flow, but this increased the rate
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of erosion both of the channel bed and stream
banks. The result was, as the Corps of Engineers report later found, "Stream erosion had
greatly enlarged this original channel both in
width and, particularly in the upper reaches,
in depth." As the river continued to cut down,
it created a steeper slope. The result: "The
channel enlargement, the river gradient, and
the drainage pattern have resulted in unbalanced capacities." At Syracuse river bankfull
occurred at about 30,500 cubic feet per second (cps) of flow. Near Talmage this increased
to 50,000 cpg, but then the channel narrowed
and the gradient moderated so that at Auburn
bankfull capacity of the river was only 26,500
CpS.38 The channel constriction near Auburn
meant that water, increasing in velocity as it
traveled down the channel from Syracuse,
would "pile up" as it approached Auburn. And
piling up in a channel meant flooding. Below
Auburn, the Corps study reported flooding
would occur every two or three years. While
the Syracusans had apparently solved their
town's flooding problem by their ditching, they
had increased the danger downstream. Although the project had been intended to decrease danger of flooding, it actually resulted
in less safety, as residents, particularly along
the upper reaches of the valley, expanded
settlement and farming in the floodplain.
When big storms arrived as they did in 1950
and 1993, the scale of disaster would be just
that much greater.
Human transformation of the prairie to
farms in the Little Nemaha Valley had serious
interrelated consequences for both the land
and the river. 39 As farmers removed more and
more of the thick prairie sod, there was less
vegetation to retard runoff and more water
ended up more quickly in streams that fed the
Little Nemaha, causing faster rises and higher
peak flows. 40 Of course, southeastern Nebraska
farmers were not turning the prairie because
of a hatred of grass; they were turning it to
make crops for market. And they were not
turning it to let it remain bare. But for a good
part of the year it would be bare, or with crops
just peeking above ground, as they found to

their sorrow in the early May flood of 1950.
While land in crops held water much better
than did bare land, it rejected water much
more than did land left to sod (or planted in
certain other nonnative grasses). The significant point is that row crops compared to sod
had 500 to 1,500 percent more runoffY

A RIVER'S NATURE
When residents of the valley attempted to
correct flooding brought about by their landuse practices, they did so through channel
modifications. In doing this they were violating a river basin's natural processes. Perhaps it
did not occur to them that the river had purpose in making all those time-wasting, senseless meanders that they were so anxious to
correct. Most of the time a river flows low in
its channel. Several times a year it flows at
three-quarters depth, and about twice a year
at bankfull. Flows above this level are not
contained within the channel but flow out
over the floodplain (overbank flows). Hydrologists Luna Leopold and Thomas Maddock Jr.
explained in 1958 why a river does not remain within its channel: "a series of complicated actions and reactions of water and
sediment leading to a type of equilibrium between river water and river channel requires
the existence of a flood plain."42 The floodplain is built by the river as it swings laterally.
The less rapidly a river downcuts through a
channel, the more it swings. Hydraulic forces
act to establish an equilibrium between what
a drainage area offers in potential energy and
what the river is able to transport in water and
debris, "When a given reach of river attains
near-stability of elevation and gradient," a
condition railroads are particularly fond of, as
we have seen, "then lateral widening of the
valley becomes the dominant process."43 As
the river channel bends, water on the outside
speeds up, eroding bank material, while water
on the inside slows and, as it does so, drops its
suspended load. This repeated deposition on
the inside of river bends creates the floodplain.

"drainage, drainage, DRAINAGE"

The height of the flood-plain surface is not
determined by the truly extraordinary floods
because of their rarity, but by the more common floods of moderate size. That is why
the river channel is not built with banks
high enough to contain the unusual flood.
It is axiomatic, then, that during the unusual flood the flood plain is truly a part of
the river channe1. 44
Forty years later, Leopold theorized why
rivers and streams of all sizes tend to form the
same meandering pattern, and do so to a degree that even he, as a geomorphologist, found
surprising. He describes a river as a classic case
of an "open system"-one that has a continuing source of potential energy (here, water to
drain from elevation). Leopold tells us that an
open system has a "tendency toward two conditions: that of minimum of work and that of
uniform distribution of work or energy utilization." Because an open system cannot achieve
both conditions at once, there is a compromise between the two. A compromise, here,
indicates a minimization of variance, "a condition known as the most probable state. The
compromise toward the most probable state is
exhibited in channel meanders."45 The reason
that rivers and streams assume the "s" shape
of the sine-generated curve is that this shape
represents the most uniform distribution of
change along the curve. The result, expressed
in this contest between water and land, is that
"by deposition and erosion, the river assumes
a pattern that is both the most probable and
the one having the smallest sum of the squares
of deviations."46
Here emerge several crucial ideas for the
history of human alterations of the Little
Nemaha Valley. Most basic is the concept of a
floodplain. Leopold states that, "the flood plain
is part of the river channel."47 While this floodplain-which widened from a half mile to two
miles on the river below Syracuse-may be
divided for hydrologic purposes into the "living floodplain" and an inactive or "historic
floodplain," we might just as easily speak of
the floodplain as being the normally dry part
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of the river. Part of the conceptual problem
for those who settle near rivers is that they
consider the floodplain separate from the river.
While townsmen and farmers might choose to
live in a floodplain, surely they would not want
to settle in a river.
Leopold's scientific profile of a river helps
to explain why human alterations in the Little
Nemaha Valley-destroying the prairie, then
straightening and shortening the river-created a particularly dangerous, unstable situation. In so radically changing the hydrologic
characteristics of the land, settlers created an
imbalance in this river system between its
upland energy potential and the "compromise"
of its downstream channel profile in relation
to its water and debris transport. Upland farmers were awakening the river; it would now
have to reach a new downstream compromise
(which it did through flooding). In "improving" their river through channel modifications,
the valley's residents were setting a straightened channel at war with the river's natural
tendency toward meanders and floodplain creation. The river would predictably try to create a larger floodplain. This was a dangerous,
essentially unrecognized, situation.
With the self-evident "efficiency" of their
drainage ditch in mind, farmers and townspeople were safe to plow and build-or so they
thought. As larger floods proved so disastrously, particularly in 1950 and 1993, they
were not safe. Their ditch had given them a
false sense of security that allowed them to
expand development. In making this development on the floodplain, to great effort and
expense, they were escalating their problems
geometrically, as their river would act forcefully to express itself when the big storms came.
With new development, and a new scale of
damage the next time around, the solutions
they would ponder would have to be correspondingly larger.
The history of Euro-American land use and
settlement patterns in the Little Nemaha Valley provides a clear example of one way in
which humans have created natural disasters.
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In not understanding, and then ignoring or
resisting the nature of the prairie that had
been conditioned by its western skies through
the ages, humans here created their own tragedies. By placing the economic value of their
system of commercial agriculture as the prime
consideration in their relationship with nature, and then only attempting piecemeal solutions on the periphery of this system, the
valley's inhabitants-farmers and townspeople-were setting themselves up for disaster. They turned the sod and planted fencerow
to fencerow, while they created towns in a
river's floodplain. Even as the Soil Conservation Service during and after the 1930s pressured farmers to use better soil conservation
practices, and even when it warned that the
land was already approaching diminishing returns in steeper sections, farmers resisted
change. 48 Even today, the Nebraska Natural
Resources Commission reports that 43 percent of Nebraska's cropland needs better erosion control, with about 34 percent eroding at
a rate damaging its ability to produce. 49 As we
have seen, farmers also altered the hydrologic
characteristics of the land, resulting in increased flooding and increased severity of
flooding. While townsfolk would alter their
urban settlements to a degree, eventually not
rebuilding in areas subject to repeated flooding,50 their preference was to change the nature of their river. This they did and then they
placed too much trust in their efforts. But water
and gravity acted according to their natures,
altering the marvels of human engineering.
Even when humans were subjected to the consequences of their actions on the land, they
did not recognize that they were responsible
for this type of "natural" disaster. Nature here,
as everywhere, continues to teach its lessons.
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